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Program for Culture & Conflict Studies at Naval Postgraduate 
School 
 
The Naval Postgraduate School’s Program for Culture and Conflict Studies (CCS) 
supports the mission of Combined Joint Task Force Afghanistan commands and the 
International Security Assistance Force. CCS serves as a reference for mission 
commanders, policy makers, analysts, non-governmental organizations and the 
general public on issues pertaining to South and Central Asia. Our program 
provides a variety of information products via our team of American, Afghan and 
Central Asian experts, through field research, conferences and analysis. 
 
This paper on Kazakhstan provides a broad reaching, but detailed analysis of 
human, structural and cultural issues affecting security and development in that 
country. Part of our Central Asia Executive Summary Series, the profile on 
Kazakhstan provides significant and needed context to the overall international 
strategy in South and Central Asia. 
 
CCS Central Asia Executive Summary Series 
CCS seeks to further the education and discussion of issues pertaining to culture 
and conflict in South and Central Asia. CCS disseminates scholarly essays and 
executive summaries that attempt to contribute to the creation of a more stable 
environment in the region. These papers identify and discuss contemporary and 
interdisciplinary issues that affect US national security interests including politics, 
economics, ethnographic intelligence, culture, geostrategic interests, national and 
local development methods, regional and cooperative security, terrorism, and tribal 
relations. CCS papers are written by faculty and staff members of the Naval 
Postgraduate School, alumni, or by individual contributors. These papers are 
disseminated online and can be downloaded free of charge at 
www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/ 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not 
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Naval Postgraduate School, 
the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense. 
 
We invite comments and questions and ask that you send them to: 
 
Professor Thomas H. Johnson Naval Postgraduate School 
1411 Cunningham Road, GL-359 Monterey, CA 93943 
Email: thjohnso@nps.edu 
Twitter: @thJohnsonNPS 
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Kazakhstan, from the Kazakh language, means a land of Kazakhs (Stan – land). 
Kazakhstan is located in Central Asia, and is the ninth largest country in the world 
(after Russia, China, USA, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, India and Australia). It is 
situated north of Uzbekistan, northwest of Kyrgyzstan, northwest of Turkmenistan, 
east of China, and south of Russia. Kazakhstan shares the Caspian Sea with other 
countries on its western border. As its neighbors in the region, Kazakhstan is a 
landlocked country and the second largest republic of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) after the Russian Federation, although the CIS id 





Astana1 from the Kazakh language means capital. Astana, previously named 
Tselinograd and later Akmola, was announced as a new capital in 1994. The 
ministries and embassies were moved to Astana in 1997. Within few years a giant 
construction project turned a small town into a magnificent city. 
 
The population of the capital at that time was primarily comprised of Slavs. The 
population has doubled to 648,300 residents, as of May 2009 according to the web 
site of Kazakh Agency of Statistics,2 with ethnic Kazakhs estimated at more than 
60 percent. 
 
The move of the national capital from Almaty to Astana, regarded as highly 
controversial and still causing some dislike from residents of Almaty, was explained 
to have occurred for several reasons: 
• Northern Kazakhstan had a high concentration of ethnic Russians who in 
early stages of independence held strong irredentist sentiments. At the same 
time nationalists across the border were calling for the return of Russian 
lands. President Nazarbaev’s strategic decision to move the capital to the 
north had a purpose of securing the territory under Kazakh sovereignty and 
bringing the ethnic proportion of Kazakhs into balance with Russians. 
• Another reason was clan rivalry when Nazarbaev from the insignificant clan 
of the Great Zhuz (Horde) was threatened by “nobler” clan groupings of the 
same horde. His move to the north was meant to weaken their pressure by 
creating a new bureaucratic environment with many young ambitious career 
oriented professionals who had little influence from clanship and hordes. 
• Other reasons justifying this geo-political move were: 
o distancing the capital from China; 
																																								 																				
1 The official web site of the capital in English: http://en.astana.kz/. 
2 In English: http://www.eng.stat.kz/Pages/default.aspx. 
	6 
 
o frequent earthquakes in Almaty; 
o scarcity of land in Almaty preventing the city’s expansion for 
administrative needs; 





INDEPENDENCE FROM THE USSR 
 
December 16, 1991 is celebrated as Independence Day. Fearing the partition of 
Kazakhstan, considering its large Russian ethnic Diaspora in the north, the 
republic was last to announce its independence. Present day Kazakhstan was 
formed by the Bolsheviks in 1920, as Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
under the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic sovereignty, and in 1936 
was given the status of a full-fledged republic. 
 
 










Total area: 2,727,300 sq km (1,049,150 sq miles). Water: 47,500 sq km 
Land: 669,800 sq km 
Border length with China: 1,460 km 
Border length with Uzbekistan: 2,300 km 
Border length with Kyrgyzstan: 980 km 
Border length with Russia: 6,467 km 











January 1 New Year 
January 7 Orthodox New Year 
March 8 International Women’s Day 
March 21-23 
Navrus (comes from ancient Zoroastrian 
tradition which many Central Asians 
take for an Islamic New Year) 
May 1 Unity Day 
May 9 Victory Day (over Nazi Germany in 
World War II) 
July 6 Capital Day 
August 30 Constitution Day 
December 16-17 Independence Day (from the USSR) 
 
The dates of the Islamic holiday Qurban Ait (Eid al-Adha in Arabic, the feast of the 
Sacrifice) change annually depending on the Islamic calendar. Another prominent 
Islamic holiday Eid al-Fitr, celebrated in Muslim counties commemorating the end 





• Official language is Kazakh, a Turkic language which also includes many 
Arabic and Persian words. There are several major regional dialects such as 
northern and southern. 
• Russian is widely used in Almaty, the northern Kazakhstan and major cities, 
among intelligentsia, political and business elites. It serves as the language 
of communication between various ethnic groups. 
• Uzbek is spoken in the south, particularly in Shymkent, Zhambyl, and 
Turkistan. 
• English is in big demand, particularly among the youth. The major reasons 







As of 2015 the total population was estimated at 17,506,000 people. Urban 
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population constituted 53.2 percent (9,313,192) and rural 46.8 percent (8,192,808).4  
 
The most densely populated region of Kazakhstan is South Kazakhstan province 
(SKP): 17-19 people per square km.5 Although the province has the smallest area 
along with Atyrau province, the population of SKP is about 2.5 million or nearly 
one-sixth of total population. Fertile land, irrigation, and geographical importance 
of the once historical towns of the ancient Silk Road along with close proximity to 
Uzbek Khanate of Kokand explain the high density of population in this region.  
Almaty and Atyrau provinces follow the list as among the most populated areas of 
the country. Aktobe and Mangystau are the least populated provinces of 
Kazakhstan with average 1.8 and 2.3 people per square km respectively. 
 
 







ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF POPULATION 
																																								 																				
4 Urban Population, The World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS/countries/KZ?display=graph.  
5 Official web site of the South Kazakhstan Province: http://ru.ontustik.kz/.  




Kazakhstan is a multiethnic society with several dozens of ethnic groups, including 
Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Bashkirs, Belarusians, Bulgarians, Chechens, Germans, 
Greeks, Ingush, Lezgins, Turkmens, Dungans, Kazakhs, Koreans, Kurds, Kyrgyz, 
Moldovans, Mordvins, Poles, Russians, Tajiks, Tatars, Ukrainians, Uyghurs, and 
Uzbeks representing many different religious, language and cultural identities. 
During Josef Stalin long repressive rule many ethnic groups were deported to 
Kazakhstan and many Jews escaped from Nazi Holocaust in Europe by fleeing to 
Central Asia, including Kazakhstan. 
 
MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS 
Ethnic Group Population Percentage of Population 
German 280,096 1.6 
Kazakh 9,068,108 51.8 
Russian 5,496,884 31.4 
Tatar 297,602 1.7 
Ukrainian 770,264 4.4 
*The total estimated population was 17,506,000.7 
 
Kazakhs 
Kazakhs are a Turkic people most of whom have Mongoloid facial features and 
belong to one of three Zhuz.8 As of June 2016, ethnic Kazakhs constituted 51.8 
percent of the total population. Significant Kazakh ethnic Diasporas reside in 
China, Mongolia, Russia, and Uzbekistan. Until the Soviet period the Kazakh tribes 
were pastoral nomads coming from Mongolian, Turkic, Iranian and a few of them 
from Arab roots. Kazakhs explain that the word Kazakh means a free spirit and 
that Kazakhstan is translated as land of Kazakhs. The majority of Kazakhs are 
Sunni Muslims and belong to the Hanafi School of jurisprudence. During the Soviet 
period many Kazakhs, particularly in northern regions, lost  the knowledge of the 
Kazakh language. Russian became the first language for the majority of Kazakhs, 
including political and business elites. In recent years, thanks to independence and 
the feelings of national pride, the Kazakh language is gaining appreciation among 
the public. 
 
Ethnic Kazakhs in neighboring states 
China 
Over 1,250,000 ethnic Kazakhs live in Xinjiang province in northwestern China, the 
region populated by Turkic Muslim peoples. The areas of geographic concentration 
of Kazakhs are: Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture, Mori Kazak Autonomous County, 
and Barkol Kazak Autonomous County in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. 
Many Kazakhs also reside in the Haixi Mongolian, Tibetan and Kazak Autonomous 
																																								 																				
7 “Kazakhstan overview - people, oil, climate, government etc.,” 
http://aboutkazakhstan.com/Kazakhstan_Overview.shtml; Urban Population, The World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS/countries/KZ?display=graph. 
8 See chapter “Traditional tribal grouping: three Zhuz (horde)” 
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Prefecture in Qinghai Province and the Aksay Kazak Autonomous County in Gansu 
Province.9 President Nazarbaev’s “Oralman” repatriation program is aimed at 
increasing the number of ethnic Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, by inviting ethnic 
Kazakhs from around the world to return to their fatherland. This has attracted 
many Chinese Kazakhs to migrate home where they have become part of the titular 




In January 2009 the total population reached 2,700,000.10 The Kazakhs of Mongolia 
make up about 6 percent of the population and constitutes the largest ethnic 
minority. They are concentrated primarily in Bayan-Ulgii Aymag, the westernmost 
province of Mongolia.11 Bayan-Ulgii Aymag is predominantly Kazakh populated 
with Kazakh as the first language and Islam as a major religion of this western 
region. 
 
During the Russian Bolshevik invasion thousands of resistance fighters were killed 
and the forceful collectivization led to mass starvation in Kazakh Soviet 
Autonomous Republic. Many thousands of Kazakh nomads fled to Mongolia. 
Kazakh President Nazarbaev’s “Oralman” repatriation program allowed Mongolian 
Kazakhs to return to the fatherland. However some new returnees were 
disillusioned by conditions they found themselves in and soon went back to 
Mongolia. 
 
Kazakhs of Mongolia are regarded as well educated and highly professional labor 
workers and bureaucrats. Most Kazakhs speak Kazakh, Mongolian and Russian. 
 
Uzbekistan 
According to the Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan nearly 1.2 million 
Kazakhs oralmans12 resided in Uzbekistan as of August 2001.13 Between 1991 and 
January of 2009, under the repatriation program, approximately 159,559 ethnic 
Kazakhs immigrated to Kazakhstan from 21 different countries. Eighty-eight 
percent of these immigrants are Kazakhs from Uzbekistan.14 
																																								 																				
9 The Kazak ethnic minority, China.org, available at: http://www.china.org.cn/e-
groups/shaoshu/shao-2- kazak.htm. 
10 “Mongolian population reaches 2.7 million,” Mongolia-Web, February 23, 2009, available at: 
http://www.mongolia-web.com/environment-news/2242-mongolian-population-reaches-27-million 
11 “About Mongolia: land and people,” Embassy of Mongolia, Washington D.C., available at: 
http://www.mongolianembassy.us/eng_about_mongolia/land_and_people.php 
12 Oralmans - ethnic Kazakhs residing in neighboring countries to Kazakhstan. 
13 “Ethnic Kazakhs Want to Leave Uzbekistan,” CACI Analyst, 29 August 2001, Available at: 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/584  
14 “Zameshayushaya demografiya: v Kazahstane popolnayut narodonaseleniye za schot oralmanov- 
“uzbekov” (Changing demography: Kazakhstan increases population by means of oralman-uzbeks), 





The major reason for emigration is the worsening economy and lack of employment 
opportunities, especially in rural areas where most of Kazakhs reside. Land 
originally devoted to cattle breeding was converted into cotton and cereal 
plantations. This further motivated traditionally nomadic Kazakhs to abandon their 
homes in Uzbekistan. 
 
There has been tension in the past over the border areas between Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan. The most prominent incident took place in December 2001. Nearly 
2,000 ethnic Kazakhs of Uzbek citizenship, declared the Turkestanets and Bagys 
villages the ‘Kazakh Bagys Republic. 
 
Russians and Ukrainians (Slavs) in Kazakhstan 
In the early 1700s, capitalizing on the weakened position of Kazakh tribes fighting 
against Kalmyk, the Russian Empire extended its territories to the south. Invasions 
of the Cossacks (semi-independent Russian and Ukrainian tribes – fighters) and 
their fortresses served well the Russian’s strategic plans. 
 
In 19th century, aimed at protecting her southern flanks from the British Empire 
marching from India north into Central Asia, and to satisfy growing economic 
needs, Russia continued occupation of territories of the Great/Senior Zhuz in the 
south and further advanced into Central Asia. This period of colonization led to the 
first waves of Slav migrants into Kazakhstan and other regions of Central Asia. 
 
The Soviet period, which started with the introduction of the new Bolshevik rule 
enforced by the Red Army, was marked by an influx of millions of Slavs. They 
controlled and managed new colonies in the south and forcefully deported other 
ethnic groups into Kazakhstan during Josef Stalin’s rule. Until 1989, the population 
was mostly Russian ethnic migrants; they significantly exceeded the local Kazakhs 
population. The table below shows the ethnic proportion of Slavs in comparison to 
Kazakhs from 1959 to 1989. 
 
Kazakhstan: Population of Slavs and Kazakhs 1959-198915 
 
Population of Slavs and Kazakhs in 1959 
Ethnic Group Number (in 
millions) 
% of total 
population 
Total population 
Kazakh 2,787,309 30 9,294,741 Russian 3,972,042 42.7 
																																								 																				
15 Data is extracted from “Dinamika chislenonsti i sostava naseleniya Kazahstana vo vtoroi polovine 
XX veka (Dynamics of size and composition of population of Kazakhstan in the 2nd half of 20th 
century), Table 3: Chislenonst samyx mnogochislennyx natsionalnostei Kazahstana v 1959-99 godax 




Ukrainian 761,432 8.2 
Belorussian 107,348 1.2 
 
Populations of Slavs and Kazakhs in 1979 
Ethnic Group Number (in 
millions) 
% of total 
population 
Total population 
Kazakh 5,289,349 36 
14,684,283 Russian 5,991,205 40.8 Ukrainian 897,964 6.1 
Belorussian 181,491 1.2 
 
In late 1980s – early 1990s the tendency reversed – many ethnic Slavs migrants 




Population of Slavs and Kazakhs in 1989 
Ethnic Group Number (in 
millions) 
% of total 
population 
Total population 
Kazakh 6,534,616 39.7 
16,464,464 
(2014) 17.7 mil 
Russian 6,227,549 37.8 
Ukrainian 809,204 5.4 
Belorussian 182,601 1.1 
 
Uzbeks of Kazakhstan 
 
As of 2014 the population of Uzbeks, the fourth largest ethnic group behind 
Kazakhs, Russians and Ukrainians, was 3 percent of the total population of 
Kazakhstan. Most Uzbeks reside in the Sayram, Tolebiy, Makhtaaral and 
Saryagash districts. Uzbeks in the cities of Turkestan, Shymkent, Kentau in South 
Kazakhstan Province, and in the Zhambyl Province are concentrated in the Merken 
district of Taraz, the capital of the province. Almaty, the largest city of Kazakhstan, 
is home to many ethnic Diasporas, including Uzbek. Uzbek tribes have inhabited 
southern parts of modern Kazakhstan for centuries, and today Uzbek cultural 
centers exist in Almaty, Shymkent, Taraz and Kyzylorda. 
 
A new wave of immigration of Uzbeks into Kazakhstan began in the late 1990s and 
continues to the present. Ambitious entrepreneurs and skilled workers who were 
restrained by lack of economic and political freedoms have moved their businesses 
to Kazakhstan. Religious persecution of Muslims practicing their faith with 
devotion in Uzbekistan, have forced many Uzbeks to look for asylum in Kazakhstan 
and other countries through the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) office in 
the Kazakh Republic. Unfortunately, in order to keep friendly relations with 
President Karimov of Uzbekistan, the Kazakh authorities deported many Uzbek 
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refugees,16 and there were cases where agents of the Uzbek National Security 
Service successfully kidnapped “enemies of the Uzbek state” on the Kazakh 
territory with illicit and concealed approval of the Kazakh side. 
 
Another significant group of ethnic Uzbeks in Kazakhstan are the labor migrants 
from impoverished Uzbekistan. Despite the economic downturn in the Kazakh 
Republic there is still a need for low pay, hard-working laborers. Although there are 
constant cases of abuse by Kazakh law-enforcement and unpaid service workers, 
thousands of Uzbeks take the risk for any job opportunities available in neighboring 
countries, particularly in Russia and Kazakhstan. 
 
Ethnic diasporas are concentrated in certain geographic areas although their 
representatives can be found anywhere across the country.  The ethnic Russians, 
Slavs and Germans primarily reside in the northern parts of the country on the 
border with Russia. Uzbeks live in Southern Kazakhstan province and in Zhambyl 
close to Uzbekistan. Uyghurs primarily reside in south-east of Kazakhstan, in the 
area from Almaty to the border with China. 
 




16 On this subject read a recent article “Refugees Still Face Uncertainty in Kazakhstan,” Aygerim 
Beysenbayeva, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, June 5, 2009. Available at: 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=353068&apc_state=henprca 








There are more than 40 different religious confessions and denominations 
represented in the Kazakhstan today. According to official statistics, there were 
3,855 religious associations registered as of June 2007. 
 
Registered religious associations in Kazakhstan as of June 200718 
Religion/Denomination Number of Associations 
Islam 2,144 
Russian Orthodox Church 270 
Roman Catholic Church 95 
Protestant Associations 1,147 
Judaism 27 
Buddhism 4 
Non-Traditional Religions 49 
 
Islam and the Russian Orthodox Church have the largest number of adherents 
although the number of Protestant Christian congregations is about four times 
higher than Russian Orthodox churches. The large number of Protestant Christian 
organizations is explained by the enormous efforts of Protestant Christian 
missionary organizations having solid funds from the West to recruit local ethnic 
Russians and Kazakhs. 
 
According to the U.S. State Department Report on Religious Freedoms 2008, there 
were two Baptist groups in the country, the Union of Evangelical Christians and 
Baptists ("Union of Baptists"), with an estimated 10,000 adherents and 227 
registered groups. Also the Council of Churches of Evangelical Christians and 
Baptists ("Council of Churches") show some 1,000 adherents, while the Council  of 
Churches Baptists refuse on principle to register. Other Christian religious groups 
with a sizable number of congregations include Presbyterians, Lutherans, 
Pentecostals, Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh-day Adventists. Smaller 
communities of Methodists, Mennonites, and Mormons are also registered.19 
 
Most Kazakhs are Sunni Muslims of Hanafi School of Jurisprudence. Traditionally, 
																																								 																				
18 STATEMENT BY MR. YERALY TUGZHANOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR 
RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN, 
AT THE OSCE CONFERENCE ON COMBATING DISCRIMINATION AND PROMOTING 
MUTUAL 
RESPECT AND UNDERSTANDING, Bucharest, June 7-8, 2007. Available at: 
http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2007/06/25050_en.pdf  
19 Kazakhstan: International Religious Freedom Report 2008, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of 




the stronghold of Islamic teaching and practice has been in southern Kazakhstan. 
Here in close proximity with Uzbeks the settled tribes of Kazakhs were highly 
influenced by Islam. The ancient cities Taraz, Turkestan, Otrar, Sayram, and 
Shymkent were all centers of Islamic learning. 
 
TAZA DIN (PURE FAITH) SOCIAL RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT 
The Muslim community calling itself Taza Din, labeled as Salafi and often called 
Wahabi by Kazakh authorities, has been subjected to harassment. Some members 
were jailed for religious extremism. More than 200 members of this new movement 
had to flee persecution. They found a temporary shelter in the Czech Republic in 
anticipation of political asylum in other countries which guarantee religious 
freedoms. The Czech government having found no international  reports about 
discrimination of this group at home and ignoring appeals of human rights 
organizations and journalists still refuses the Kazakh Muslim community asylum. 
However, the former chairman of Kazakh National Security Committee Alnur 
Musaev warned that they would face the threat of harassment and persecution if 
deported to Kazakhstan.20 The members of this group are primarily ethnic Kazakhs 
from the western regions of Kazakhstan. At home, the government claims Salafis 
are not banned but some members were linked with religious violent Muslim 
extremist organizations. According to independent experts, the “Taza Din” strives to 
practice the Islamic faith by following the Quran and the hadiths (narrations of 
Prophet Muhammad) while refusing to adhere to local traditional Islam mixed with 
Shamanism and Tengriism (ancient religion practiced in pre-Islamic period) and 
controlled by the government appointed clergy.21 
 
Religious missionary activities are banned and therefore the Islamic propagation 
group that originated in India and now based in Pakistan, the “Tablighi Jamaat”.  It 
is not permitted in Kazakhstan. 
 
Another peaceful, apolitical group of Sufis following the Naqshbandi order, which 






Kazakhstan is administratively divided into 14 provinces with 159 districts, 84 
																																								 																				




21 A well researched report on this movement and prosecution by the government had been produced 




cities, 241 settlements, and 2,042 aul (rural) counties. 
 
Administrative Units (in area size sequence) 
Administrative Unit 
(province/city) 
Area (in sq. km) Capital City 
Karagandy 428,000 Karagandy 
Aktobe 300,600 Aktobe 
Shygys (East) Kazakhstan 283,300 Oskemen 
Kyzylorda 226,000 Kyzylorda 
Almaty Province 224,000 Taldykorgen 
Kostanay 196,000 Kostanay 
Mangystau 165,600 Aktau 
Batys (West) Kazakhstan 151,300 Oral 
Zhambyl 144,000 Taraz 
Pavlodar 124,800 Pavlodar 
Soltusik (North) Kazakhstan 123,200 Petropavl 
Akmola 121,400 Kokshetau 
Atryau 118,600 Atryau 
Ontustik (South) Kazakhstan 118,600 Shymkent 
Almaty (previous capital) 324,800  










REGIONS REQUIRING FOREIGNERS TO OBTAIN 
PERMISSION TO ACCESS 
 
• Baikonyr city 
• Karmakchinsky district of Kyzylorda oblast. 
• Kazalinsky district of Kyzlorda oblast. 
 
SETTLEMENTS TEMPORARY CLOSED TO FOREIGNERS 
• Gvardeisky (75°16'25; 43°33'58), 
• Matebulak of Almaty oblast (75°15'35; 43°36'9) 
• Railway junction Kulzhabasy in Zhambyl oblast. 
 






















President of Republic of Kazakhstan 
 
LIST OF MEMBERS OF CABINET OF MINISTERS 
AS OF JUNE 2016 
 




First Deputy Prime Minister 
 
Dariga Nazarbayeva 





Deputy Prime Minister 
Minister of Agriculture 
 
Kalmukhanbet Kassymov 





Dauren Askerbekovich Abaev 
Minister of Information and Communications 
 
Muhamediuly Arystanbek 




Bishimbayev Kuandyk Valikhanovich 
Minister of National Economy 
 
Imangali Tasmagambetov 
Minister of Defense 
 
Kasyymbek Zhenis Mahmudovich 
Minister of Investment and Development 
 
Talgat Sovetbekovich Donakov 
Minister of Civil Service Affairs 
 
Yerlan Kenjeğalïulı Sagadiyev 




Tamara Kasymovna Duissenova 
Minister of Health and Social Development 
 
Bakhyt Sultanov 
Minister of Finance 
 
Kanat Aldabergenovich Bozumbayev 






OFFICIAL POLITICAL PARTIES 
Following the example of then president Vladimir Putin and the “Unified Russia” 
party in Russia, President Nazarbaev controls the legislation through his proxy 
party the “Nur Otan” in bicameral parliament which consists of the Senate (47 
seats) and the Mazhilis (107 seats). 
 
The People’s Democratic Party “Nur Otan” is the pro-president party dominating 
the Kazakh parliament, holding 98 seats in Mazhilis while 9 other seats are elected 
by the Assembly of peoples of Kazakhstan. The success of the party at the 2007 
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parliament election was explained by the high party membership requirement - the 
barrier established by the election law which is designed to protect the pro-
president party’s “success” during elections. The law on political parties, past 
parliamentary and the presidential elections do not satisfy international standards 
but provides necessary measures for the incumbent president and his lobbyists in 
the parliament to secure their lucrative positions. The party claims to have nearly 
700,000 members nationwide. The Otan was founded in 1999 and was joined by the 
Civic Party, the Agrarian Party and Dariga Nazarbaeva’s Asar party and in 2006 it 
was named as the Nur-Otan party. The party was reported by local and 
international observers as having used administrative resources to gain large 
membership mostly among government officials who were willing to express their 
loyalty to Nazarbaev by joining the pro-president Nur-Otan. 
 
Other secular political parties loyal or in “mild” opposition to the 
government: 
• The Rukhaniyat (‘Rebirth’) Party 
• The Party of Patriots of Kazakhstan (PPK) Adilet (“Justice”)24 
• Ak-Zhol (“Bright Path”)25 
• The Kazakhstan’s Social Democratic Party Auyl (“Village”)26 
• The Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan (CPPK)27 
 
Secular “hard-core” opposition parties: 
• The Democratic party of Kazakhstan Azat (Freedom)28 
• All-national Social Democratic Party 
• Alga (“Forward”) People’s Party (unregistered) 
o Alga originated from the banned Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and 
as its mother party has never been refused registration the authorities. 
• Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK)29 Re: Johnson & Youngquist 
#1062010072 
o On April 11 the Almaty Forum of democratic forces included the Azat 
Democratic Party, the National Social Democratic Party, the 
Communist Party of Kazakhstan, and the Alga People’s Party, all of 
which constitute the core of political opposition to President Nazarbaev 
and his Nur-Otan party. They chose to unite into one political party. 
Political party blocs are not allowed under the Kazakh law on elections 
but the opposition views the merger of parties into one as the only 
																																								 																				
24 Official web site: http://www.dp-adilet.kz/  
25 Official web site: http://www.akzhol.kz/  
26 Official web site: http://www.ksdp-auyl.kz/  
27 Official web site: http://www.knpk.kz/  
28 Official web site: http://www.azat-party.info/  
29 For more official information on this and other parties read the web site of the Central Election 








According to the constitution, Kazakhstan is a secular state and no parties based on 
religious platform may function legally, regardless if they use violent or peaceful 
means. At this moment the only religious organization which represents a security 
concern for authorities is Hizb-ut-Tahrir. 
 
 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) 
The party’s goal is rebuilding the single Islamic Khilafah State (Caliphate) through 
propagation and peaceful transformation of Muslim society and finally establishing 
‘Islamic household.’31  The radical party which is predominantly Sunni, with Islam 
as an ideology, has not employ violent means but Central Asian governments have 
accused HT in terrorism.  There has been recent talk, however, of some HT 
members starting to align with the Islamic State (IS). 
 
HT is anti-Western, anti-Semitic, anti-secular, considers democracy a Kufr system, 
and calls for the overthrow of Muslim governments which do not obey the party’s 
vision of the Islamic governance and according to them, the country is currently a 
‘Kufr household.’32 
 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir members first appeared in Central Asia in mid-1990s in Uzbekistan. 
The massive arrest campaign launched by the government aftermath of the 
Tashkent February 1999 bombings brought the party into the spotlight, which has 
been unknown for Central Asians. The government blamed IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir 
but arrested not only alleged members of these organizations but anybody who 
regularly attended prayers and was known for religious piety. Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s 
regular members openly criticized the unpopular government of Karimov and did 
not accept the offer from President Karimov for pardon. This gesture won the 
respect of many people who might not have shared the ideology of the organization 
but agreed with critical statements towards the ruling regime. 
 
Although the party claims to be peaceful some members left the party and either 
joined the militant movements or created their separate cells (not associated with 
HT) which use violence. The organization is banned in all Central Asian states. 
 
																																								 																				
30 For detailed information on political parties read “Parliament and Political Parties in 
Kazakhstan,” by Anthony Clive Bowyer, Silk Road Paper, May 2008, Central Asia-Caucasus 
Institute, available at: 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0804Bowyer.pdf  





Hizb-ut-Tahrir, despite its popularity in early stages of its appearance in Central 
Asia, failed to become a popular movement due to highly secretive recruitment, 
heavy repressions, little interest among populace in political Islam and theological 
discrepancies with mainstream Islamic doctrine called Aqidah in Arabic.  
Differences in doctrine of Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama‘ah (majority of Muslims) and of 
HT is a significant obstacle for broad public support and recruitment of new 
members, particularly among religiously educated Muslims. Regular members are 
more preoccupied with political work, despite religious rhetoric, that makes some 
believe they are a purely religious organization. The frequency and quantity of 
leaflet distribution among the populace in the region has been decreasing and the 
number of arrests of alleged members of HT has decreased, which indicates the 
party has lost ground in Central Asia. 
 
Traditionally, HT was popular among ethnic Uzbeks; besides Uzbekistan the 
organization was also active in the border areas of neighboring counties populated 
by ethnic Uzbeks. Currently the group is most active in Kyrgyz and Tajik sections of 
the Ferghana Valley and the southern regions of Kazakhstan. 
 
 
FOREIGN MILITARY BASES 
 
Kazakhstan does not host any foreign military bases. Russia however leases the 




The semi-arid area located at the Tyuratam railroad junction in the village of 
Tyuratam, on the right bank of the Syr Darya River in close proximity to the town 
of Jezkazgan, is known as the Soviet space program testing site. Built in 1950s it 
has launched all Soviet and Russian space stations, including intercontinental 
multistage ballistic rockets. The name Baikonur (official names of the site were 
NIIP-5 and GIK-5 and often referred to as Tyuratam) was given deliberately to 
mislead the West about the location of the secret site during the Cold War. The 
space program test site Baikonur, was given the name of a small mining town 
situated in a different place 200 miles away. The area of the 
  
Baikonur cosmodrome is very large – it extends 85 km from north to south, and 125 
km east to west, making it the largest space center in the world. 
 
Under the renewed contract, the lease is extended until 2050 and is managed by the 
Federal Space Agency and the Space Forces of the Russian Federation. The once 
Soviet strategic missile fire test ground, the Tyuratam still might be used by 
Russian Strategic Missile Forces to test fire intercontinental missiles. According to 
news reports, an SS-19 intercontinental missile was launched from Baikonur on 
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October 22, 2008.33 The area has restricted access. 
 
 
EXPORTING OIL AND GAS: PIPELINES 
 
The major importance of Kazakhstan for the international political economy lies in 
the country’s principal wealth – oil and gas. Kazakhstan is among the world’s top 
producers and exporters of crude oil and natural gas. According to the BP Statistical 
Review of World Energy 2009, Kazakhstan’s proven crude oil reserves are 
estimated, at the beginning of 2009, at 39.8 billion barrels, which make up nearly 
3.2 percent of the world’s reserves. It is now estimated to have 100 billion barrels in 
reserve, especially along the Caspian Sea shoreline (Tengiz Basin). The proven 
natural gas reserves have been found to reach 85 trillion cubic feet. 
 
Kazakhstan and neighboring states try to diversify their energy export routes and 
are currently developing new projects to provide oil and gas to Europe, China and 
their traditional market in Russia. The energy rich region of Central Asia has 
become the magnet for geo-strategic ambitions of the major powers and as many 
observers now call it the “Great Game”, is sure to intensify. The control of the 
strategic commodities of oil and gas and their supply are not only important for 





There are functioning pipelines and planned projects which (will) produce and 
export oil from Kazakhstan to its traditional markets and also to new 
international markets. 
 
Existing and Planned Central Asian Oil Pipelines34 
																																								 																				
33 “Russia test-fires old missile to extend lifespan,” Reuters, Oct 22, 2008, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE49L2L320081022  



















Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)35 
																																								 																				





CPC Shareholders: Russian Federation (represented by Transneft – 24% and CPC 
Company – 7%) – 31%; Republic of Kazakhstan (Kazmunaigaz) – 19%; Chevron 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium Company - 15%; LUKARCO B.V. – 12.5%;Mobil 
Caspian Pipeline Company – 7.5%; Rosneft-Shell Caspian Ventures Limited – 7.5%; 
BG Overseas Holding Limited - 2%; Eni International N.A. N.V. - 2%; Kazakhstan 
Pipeline Ventures LLC – 1.75% and Oryx Caspian Pipeline LLC – 1.75%.36 
 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline 
Since October 2008, Kazakhstan started transporting oil by tankers to the Turkish 
port city of Ceyhan through Georgia and Azerbaijan by using the Baku-Tbilisi- 
Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. The security situation in Georgia has had a significant 
impact on the volume of oil transported to Turkey via Georgia where the political 
conflict between opposition and President Shaakashvili may lead to instability. On 
May 27, the radical opposition members blocked the railroads of the Tbilisi Central 
Railroad Station. On June 2, an explosion took place at the railroad station in 
Ingiri, West Georgia, which interrupted the movement of passenger and passenger 
trains for a day. According to experts, the perpetrators of the attack used explosive 
devises with a clock mechanism.37 
 
The volume of Kazakh transported oil via BTC evenly fluctuated from October 2008 
to June 2009. In May 163,000 tons were exported by Kazakhstan via this pipeline. 
 
																																								 																				
36 For more information on the consortium g to official web site of the CPC: 
http://www.cpc.ru/DesktopDefault.aspx?lang=en-US 
37 “Positivnye prognozy na fone negativnoi dinamiki” (Positive prognosis on the negative dynamics 






Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS) 
A projected oil transportation link with the Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline will allow 
an increase of Kazakhstan’s crude oil to flow to Europe via Azerbaijan. An 
agreement between the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan and the “KazMunaiGaz” 
Company was signed in November 2008, and its feasibility study was finalized. A 
new ambitious plan to transport oil from the Kashagan and Tengiz oil fields in 
Kazakhstan to countries of the European Union should bypass Russia. The plan 
also included construction of a Caspian port in Kuryk, additional pipelines from the 
oilfields to a new 729 km pipeline in “Eskene an - Kuryk port”, and the building of a 
new tanker fleet - all of this will bring additional Kazakh oil to the Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline. The total cost of the project, excluding construction of tankers, is 
estimated at nearly US$ 2. 2 billion and is planned to start functioning in 2013.38 
 
Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline 
Map of the Route39 
 
																																								 																				
38 “Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System to be launched in 2013,” Official web site of Akim’s 
administration of Bostandyk District, Kazakhstan June 8, 2009. Available at: 
http://www.bostandyk.almaty.kz/page.php?page_id=161&lang=3&news_id=3670  




The first and second stages of the transnational pipeline are already completed. The 
third stage is was completed in 2009 and became operational in 2010. This final 761 
km link connects Kumkol and Kenkiyak, the final stages of the pipeline. China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Kazakh State Company 
KazMunayGaz were the two investors in this US$ 3 billion project with capacity up 
to 20 million tons a year. Kazakh oil, from the Kumkol field of the Aktobe region, 
was pumped through 813 mm wide pipeline into China in May 2006. It marked 
Central Asia’s energy export independence from Russia and became China’s first 
direct source of oil that lessens Beijing’s excessive dependence on the narrow 805 
km Strait of Malacca, the traditional route for most of China's foreign oil that faces 
piracy issues. 
 
Chinese National Petroleum Corporation’s $4.18 billion overpriced purchase of 
PetroKazakhstan in 2005 along with generous loans to Central Asian states and 
construction of oil and gas pipelines are aimed at securing energy resources in a 
close and stable neighborhood. The huge economic investment into neighboring 
states of Central Asia provides political importance to Beijing which is concerned 
with the presence of American bases and NATO’s engagement in the region. And at 




The country’s natural gas reserves represent about 1 percent of the world’s reserves. 
Most of Kazakhstan’s gas reserves are located in the west of the country near the 
Caspian Sea, with roughly 25% of proved reserves located in the Karachaganak 
field.40 
 
During the Soviet period Kazakhstan was a transit point for natural gas from 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to Russia, European parts of the Soviet Union and 
further to the Caucasus. In 2000, Kashagan oil and gas field were discovered and 
Kazakhstan turned itself into an exporter when these new reserves were found. 
 
The growing need for gas in Europe and China and the increase in prices of these 
commodities have attracted investment into Kazakh oil and gas sectors. Currently, 
there are several international projects under development and/or consideration to 






40 “Kazakhstan’s gas reserves 1.82 tcm; crude reserves 39.8 billion barrels – BP,” Silk Road 
Intelligencer, June 23, 2009, available at: http://silkroadintelligencer.com/2009/06/23/kazakhstans-

















Central Asia-Center Pipeline System42 
																																								 																				
41 Map 1 Major Gas Fields and Pipelines of Kazakhstan, p.35 from “Kazakhstan’s Gas: Export 
Markets and Export Routes,” Shamil Midkhatovich Yenikeyeff, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 
November 2008. Available at:  http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG25.pdf  





The construction of the first Soviet pipeline to transport Central Asian gas to the 
north started in late 1960s and was expanded into a five parallel pipeline system. 
But in the late 1980s Gorbachov’s perestroika and demokratizatsiya preoccupied the 
minds of inhabitants of the Kremlin and the pipeline expansion ended. The CAC 
system supplied natural gas from the fields in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to the 
Soviet republics of the northern Caucasus, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and southern 
Kazakhstan. 
 
After the collapse of the USSR, Kazakhstan and its neighbors became frustrated 
with Russia’ s monopoly on oil and gas. Moscow dictated price and volume of export 
and transit of their commodities and used pipelines as a tool of political 
manipulations. Such circumstances along with Europe’s search for alternative gas 
supplies and China’s growing economy offered energy rich “Stans” new gas markets.  
In the growing battle over Central Asian energy resources between Europe, China 
and Russia, Moscow views this pipeline system as strategic economic and 
geopolitical priority and has tried to revitalize the gas transport link in order to 
keep the supply of gas to Europe under Kremlin control. 
 
However, Kazakhstan and the other states of the region offer higher gas volumes 
than what Russia is willing to buy. Kazakhstan has used the CAC system to export 
its gas but Russia with her CAC system monopoly have become a barrier for Astana 
to earn more currency from her rich gas fields. 
 
A significant political blow to the Central Asia-Center pipeline system occurred in 
April of 2009. On April 8, an explosion of the CAC-4 pipeline branch in 
Turkmenistan near the Uzbek border occurred. Moscow, one day earlier, decided to 
cut the import of Turkmen gas (main export commodity) and it decreased pressure 
in the pipe, which caused the accident. This resulted in significant damage to the 
Turkmenistan’s economic interests. This accident pushed the Turkmen government 
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to aggressively look for alternative markets for natural  gas, Ashgabat’s major 
income. 
 
The new gas export routes under construction and are: 
• Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline 
• Kazakhstan-China Pipeline 
 
 
ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN—WHAT IS BEHIND? 
 
The growing number of arrests of high profile individuals highlights the 
confrontation between powerful elites in present day Kazakhstan. President 
Nazarbaev was able to dominate for a long time thanks to a powerful and ruthless 
security apparatus. The system used was that of rewarding loyalty and punishing 
dissent to weaken and empower business and political elites. 
 
A widespread campaign punishing corruption and other financial and economic 
crimes is used to neutralize the potential threat to Nazarbaev’s power. Pressuring 
powerful political and business figurers, and not necessarily thosecritical of the 
current regime, is a part of a broader political game used to increase tensions 
between powerful clans. Regionalism and Zhuz alliances are important ingredients 
to the mix of rivals for regional and central powers. 
 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan government officials control the private sector 
through relatives or by what they directly own themselves. This direct dependency 
of business elites on the political establishment was designed to prevent the rise of 
independent business elites. The government of Kazakhstan (in comparison with 
the above mentioned countries) allowed independent businesses and tolerated, to 
some degree, opposition parties, journalists, and NGOs criticism of Nazarbaev’s 
policies. Kazakhstan’s comparative political and economic freedoms allowed local 
entrepreneurs and bankers to become extremely rich. 
 
The politically and economically more liberal environment produced the new class 
of wealthy businessmen. Some of them connected with government officials critical 
of President Nazarbaev, seeing themselves as alternatives to the president. The 
case of former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin was the first high-level official 
to turn against the president. The former Premier criticized Nazarbaev for 
strengthening authoritarianism, nepotism and for his lack of commitment to human 
rights. He left the official post and got involved in politics but had to flee 
Kazakhstan in 1998. 
 
The government claims some former officials and current wealthy entrepreneurs 
turned into oppositional politicians when under investigation, pointing at a 
prominent businessman and previous Minister of Energy, Mukhtar Ablyazov. Mr. 
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Ablyazov was the chairman of the Board at BTA Bank JSC which was the largest 
private bank in Kazakhstan and one of the largest private banks in the former 
Soviet Union. Banker Ablyazov was also one of the founders of an opposition party 
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan  created in 2001. He had to flee Kazakhstan in 
2009 when the national security agents resumed the investigation into his business 
operations. The government has nationalized the BTA Bank which faced insolvency 
disaster amid the world economic crisis in 2008. 
 
Arrests and reshuffling of the top officials and business executives has become a 
regular procedure in Kazakh politics. For instance, in November of 2008 the 
chairman of the Kazakh National Railway Company Zhaksybek Kulekeev was 
imprisoned for what was reported as accepting bribes in large amounts. In March of 
this year Serik Burkitbaev, the former head of the oil and gas state company 
KazMunaiGaz, was also sent to prison for allegedly committing economic crimes. 
 
In April, Deputy Defense Minister of Kazakhstan Kazhimurat Maermanov was 
arrested on charges of buying flawed military hardware from Israel. In late May– 
early June 2009, the government conducted a series of arrests of senior officials and 
businessmen on the pretext of corruption and other financial offenses. Dr. Mukhtar 
Dzhakishev, president of KazAtomProm State Company, was arrested after the 
financial investigation of BTA Bank JSC. It allegedly discovered illegal practices 
that led to KazAtomProm’s top executive to face charges of large scale 
embezzlement of state property. 
 
In early June, the State Agency for Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption 
submitted the criminal cases to the court against ex- Minister for Environmental 
Protection Nurlan Iskakov and his former deputies Zeynulla Sarsembaev and 
Alzhan Braliev. 
 
The financial police also arrested Birlik Mendybaev, the deputy-chairman of the 
Agency for Statistics for misappropriation of 764, 8 million tenge (approximately 
US$ 5 million) that the agency officials claimed were spent for conducting the 
national census in 2009. 
 
The most scandalous episode of the war on the political top is the case of Rakhat 
Aliev, the former son-in-law of President Nursultan Nazarbaev. He served as the 
deputy chief of the Kazakh Intelligence Service and earned the rank of Major – 
General. Aliev turned against the patron and his father-in-law in 2007 when 
President Nazarbaev sent him abroad for alleged illegal activities involving 
racketeering, kidnapping, torture and even the murder of businessmen. Receiving 
full benefits from a senior government position and access to the inner circle of the 
president, Aliev became critical of Nazarbaev when the Parliament approved a 
constitutional amendment in May of 2007 allowing the current president to run for 
elections with no limit of terms. Rakhat Aliev, who tried to conceal his 
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uncontrollable ambition to become the next president, realized that he could not 
come to power as long as his father-in-law was in power, so he turned to the West 
for asylum as a democrat reformer. Austria dismissed the evidence provided by 
Kazakhstan against Rakhat Aliev and his associates that they were allegedly 
involved in criminal activities in Kazakhstan including the abduction of top 
managers of the Kazakh commercial bank Nurbank. This scandalous case is known 
as Rakhatgate.43 Observers critical of Vienna’s decision to keep Aliev free believe 
Austria uses him as a political asset in EU’s negotiations with oil rich Kazakhstan. 
Rakhat Aliev died in February of 2015 in an Austrian prison awaiting trial on 
charges of murder. His trial was planned to start in Vienna in first half of year 
2015. 
 
Most former government officials and business people arrested by the authorities 
for alleged criminal activities deny wrongdoing and claim the arrests are politically 
motivated. President Nazarbaev insists that he is combating corruption – the state 
policy he announced and launched in 2006. However, the law is obviously not 
applied equally to all who have engaged in criminal activities, but rather only to 
those who may pose a danger to Nazarbaev’s grip onpower. The world economic 
crisis hit the country and has had a negative impact on the reputation of the 
president. The timing is convenient and suitable for clamping down on potential 
dissent. The jailed bankers and top executives of state companies are blamed for the 
economic difficulties. People associated with Mukhtar Dzhakishev, the president of 
KazAtomProm State Company, claim the government and international audit firms 
conducted regular inspections of the state company’s operations. If Mr. Dzhakishev 
was involved in shadowy financial activities he did it on the order of President 
Nazarbaev himself.44 Some observers suspect that the real reason for arresting 
Mukhtar Dzhakishev is his personal ties with Nazarbaev’s first enemy Rakhat 
Aliev. Aliev has very close personal and business relations with the president’s 
ideological foe Mukhtar Ablyazov. The first statements by the government 
authorities that the KazAtomProm is involved in criminal financial activities 
appeared a decade ago although no action took place at that time. Mukhtar 
Ablyazov’s departure  abroad threatens to leak information on the involvement of 
the highest government officials, including the president, in possible machinations 
that KazAtomProm forced Nazarbaev to change the leadership of the state company 
which is a strategic asset for the ruling family clan of the president. 
 
The modern political history of Kazakhstan under Nazarbaev was also marked by 
political assassinations and threats of the regime’s ideological opponents and 
journalists critical of the authorities. In November of 2005, Zamanbek Nurkadilov, 
a prominent opposition leader and former governor of Almaty province was found 
shot dead. Many ordinary citizens and the prominent  figures of civil society, 
																																								 																				
43 More information on this case can be found at the web site “The Surgeon’s Case” at 
http://rakhataliyev.com/en/item.php?item=1019  
44 Anonymous email interviews with the employees of KazAtomProm State Company, June 2009. 
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including opposition figures and independent media suspected he was murdered on 
the order of Rakhat Aliev (president’s son in law) who then held the post of the 
Deputy Chairman of National Security Committee. However, the official 
investigation concluded the vocal critic and a potential political rival of the 
president committed suicide and the case was closed. 
 
In 2006, another influential contender for the post of president Altynbek 
Sarsenbaev, the leader of the opposition party Naghz Aq Zhol (from Kazakh means 
True Bright Path), was shot along with his two assistants. Erzhan Utembaev, the 
chief of staff of the Kazakh Senate, wrote a letter to the president accusing himself 
of murdering the president’s opponent. He and nine officers of the National Security 
Committee were imprisoned for an alleged personal dispute murder, but many 
experts believe Erzhan Utembaev and officers of the security service were victims of 
President Nazarbaev’s war on powerful rivals. Other observers suspect that Rakhat 
Aliev targeted his future competitors but the president, his father-in-law, had to 
cover his ambitious and vicious relative because they both were “in the same boat.” 
Chairman of the political council of the Atameken opposition party, Erzhan 
Dostmukhamedov, requested President Nazarbaev openly to investigate the 
involvement of his other son-in-law Kulibaeb in the murder of Altynbek 
Sarsenbaev. Analysts say both men – Rakhat Aliev and President Nazarbaev 
possess enormous compromising materials against each other but can’t reveal all 
they know as it can hurt both parties. Aliev’s new book “Godfather-in-law” 
published in 2009 in Europe and banned in Kazakhstan, fails to tell the whole story 
about President Nazarbaev. 
 
Despite a more open political system than Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan these 
murder cases indicate what tactics Kazakh authorities have used and are willing to 
use to preserve their power. Although Nazarbaev was reelected in 2012, as the 
amendment to the Constitution gives him the right to do for an unlimited number of 
terms, the ambitions and resources of other powerful figures may constitute a 
significant threat to his power in the future. In June 2000, legislation was passed 





ACTIVIZATION OF CLAN NETWORKS RIVARLY—A SOURCE 
OF INSTABILITY 
 
Local and regional experts explain the nationwide reshuffling of government 
officials, arrests of prominent business people and political assassinations as the 
battle between powerful clans over political, economic and administrative resources 
and ultimately – over the post of the presidency. As some observers predict the 





Although the presidential election is to be held in 2012 the diminished resources of 
the elites amid the global economic crisis, which has had a significant effect on 
Kazakhstan’s economy and on the stability of elites, has sharpened tensions 
between the groups trying to seize and obtain political and economic power. 
 
The clan rivalry leads to negative consequences for economic recovery, and more 
importantly, international investment confidence. Presently, the President is 
preoccupied with trying to balance power between the elites and pacify rising social 
tensions. Understanding the traditional and modern clans, based on  family, region, 
personal loyalty, political and business interests is key in predicting Kazakhstan’s 
internal political trajectory which affects foreign policy and regional stability. 
Which clans will shape Kazakhstan’s politics if Nazarbaev decides to depart or is 
unable to resist the growing pressure from other influential groups? There are two 
major types of alliances - the traditional tribal alliance, or Zhuz system and the 
modern political/economic power grab represented by political, regional and 
business figures. Thanks to capitalist injections into post-tribal and post-Soviet 
Kazakh society, both networks can include a mixture of players. 
 
TRADITIONAL TRIBAL GROUPING: THREE ZHUZ (HORDE) 
Despite common Mongoloid physical features Kazakhs have diverse ethnic origins, 
including Turkic, Mongol Indo-Iranian groups and Arabs (spreading Islam in 
Central Asia during the 8th century). 
 
Most of ethnic Kazakhs belong to one of three Zhuz (hordes): Uly Zhuz (the 
Great/Senior Horde), Orta Zhuz (the Middle Horde) and Kishi Zhuz (the 
Small/Young Horde). Some scholars argue each zhuz originates from the family of 
three sons of the mystical forefather of Kazakhs. The names of the hordes do not 
represent the size, but the age superiority of these brothers who became the 
founders of the modern Kazakh nation. Other scholars believe steppe nomadic 
Kazakhs built territorial confederations of tribes in the 1600s to be able to control 
the areas of the disintegrating Kazakh Khanate which were being seized by 
neighboring khans. Each zhuz consisted of many tribes which were further divided 
into clans. The Great/Senior Zhuz consists of the Alban, Dulat, Zhalair, Kanly, 
Oshakty, Suan, Shaprashty, Ysty, Srgeli and Sary-Uysun tribes. President 
Nazarbaev is from Shaprashty (which is considered a less important group) tribe of 
the Great/Senior Zhuz. The Middle Horde is represented by Argyn, Kerey, Kypshak, 
Konrat, Nayman and Uak tribes. The Young/Small Confederation includes Alimuly, 
Bayuly and Zheteru. Each Zhuz was ruled by Khan and had a separate army. 
Brotherly relations were sometimes marked by bloody conflicts. Geographically the 
zhuzes populated the area of modern Kazakhstan in the following locations: the 
Great/Senior Zhuz occupied the region located south of the Lake Balkhash, known 
as Semirechye (“Land of the Seven Rivers;” in Russian). The tribes of the Middle 
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Zhuz resided in central and eastern parts of the country and the Young/Small Zhuz 
controlled western Kazakhstan.45 
 
Kazakhs who descend from Tore (Genghis Khan) or Khaji (the first four Khalifas 
following Prophet Muhammad and Arabs missionaries who spread Islam in the 
region), and descendants of Jungar (Kalmyk) war prisoners are not members of the 
zhuz. 
 
The Soviets tried to erase the Zhuz identity by substituting it with the universal 
Soviet citizen identity. Despite the formal equal status of all peoples and ethnicities 
residing in the Soviet Union the passport would still bear one’s nationality; with 
separate ethnicities, ranks were given to different ethnic groups. The inability or 
unwillingness to genuinely dismantle the tribal network system during the 70 years 
of Sovietization and Russification, sharpened the rivalry between zhuz. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union the newly elected first president of Kazakhstan 
Nursultan Nazarbaev tried to strengthen his grip on power by balancing influence 
between the local elites that have built powerful political and financial groupings 
guaranteeing access to resources and to the President. 
 
Today the role of zhuz in cadre politics is more important on regional levels. In the 
capital, the traditional tribal networks are largely substituted by alliances built on 
personal ties and common political/business interests. 
 
MODERN POLITICAL AND BUSINESS ALLIANCES 
There are several powerful political-business alliances that compete for influence 
over the president. Nursultan Nazarbaev’s family clan is the dominant grouping 
among the rival elites. This year, President Nazarbaev will celebrate his 20th 
anniversary since he became the head of Kazakh Republic in 1989. 
 
President Nazarbaev Family Clan 
Dariga and Dinara are two of three daughters of the president who are known for 
their political and/or financial activism and for their enormous wealth. 
 
Dariga Nazarbaeva, Oldest Daughter of President Nazarbaev46 
 
																																								 																				
45 For the detailed map of Kazakh Zhuz and clans see separate attachment to this document or the 
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http://www.brif.kz/eng/maps/pdf/Kz_Tribe_e.pdf  
The map is produced by “Brief” Research Group based in Kazakhstan. 





Nazarbaev’s oldest daughter Dariga, ex-wife of Rakhat Aliev, was the head of the 
news agency Habar (news) from 2001- 2006 and was chairwoman of the Congress of 
journalists. She politically supported her father by forming the political party Asar, 
which in 2006 merged with the pro-Nazarbayev party Otan dominating the 
parliament. She and her son Nurali are major share holders of the Nurbank. Dariga 
was viewed as the president’s first pick to run the country after his departure. 
However her criticism of policies were viewed as support for her late-husband 
Rakhat Aliev’s political ambitions whom she divorced in 2007 before his death. This 
reduced her chances to receive political support from her father who began to doubt 
his eldest daughter’s true loyalty. The once politically and financially powerful 
tandem of Rakhat and Dariga was significantly weakened amid Rakhatgate.  
However, she is now again viewed as potential successor and on 11 September 2015 
















Middle daughter Dinara Kulibaeva (Nazarbaeva) was director of the Educational 
Foundation named after her father, President Nazarbaev. She is married to Timur 
Kulibae, a politically powerful billionaire businessman. According to Forbes, their 
net worth is US$ 2. 7 billion, made the world’s #428 billionaires in 2008.48 Dinara 
and her husband are major share holders of the Halyk Bank, the third-largest bank 
in the country. She is not involved in politics like Dariga and professionally focuses 
on issues of public and private education in Kazakhstan. She is known for avoiding 
press and posing for photographs.   
 




Timur Kulibaeb, Dariga’s husband and son-in-law of President Nazarbaev, is 
considered to be among the possible candidates to succeed Nazarbaev. Timur is a 
member of the inner circle of the family of the president. Nazarbaev was irritated 
with Kulibaev’s out of marriage relationship with Goga Ashkenazi (maiden name 
Gauhar Berkalieva, an ethnic Kazakh residing in the United Kingdom) who gave 
birth to Adam, third son of Timur. His overtures with expensive foreign escorts who 
fly on Kulibaev’s private jets to join his lavish parties, stains the reputation of the 
president’s family. On May 21, Timur was appointed chairman of the Board of 
directors of KazMunayGas company, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy  (Kazakhstan 
Railways JSC)49 and SamrukEnergo which are subsidiaries of Kazakhstan’s State 
Holding for Management of State Assesses.50 
 
Previously Kulibaev held a key position in oil and gas sectors which allowed him to 
generate a significant amount of political power and wealth. He and his spouse 
Dinara are primary shareholders of the Halyk Bank. They were named the world’s 
#428 billionaires in 2008. Timur who tried to better his family ties by expressing 
loyalty to Dinara improved his image in the eyes of the president elevating his 




49 The official web site of the national company: http://www.railways.kz/  




The 2016 World’s Billionaires from Kazakhstan51 
 
Rank Name Citizenship Age Net Worth Residence 
771 Bulat 
Utemuratov 
















Kazakhstan 55 $1.48 Almaty, 
Kazakhstan 
 




Aliya, the youngest daughter of President Nazarbaev, is considered the least 
interested in a public career. She prefers to focus on her business constructing 
apartment buildings and other facilities for the elite and is also a professional 
singer. She spent many years in the West where she received her education. She 
speaks English, German and Russian. In 1998, at the age of 18 she married Aidar 
Akaev, son of the then president of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akaev. Soon the couple 
divorced and in 2002 Aliya married Daniyar Khasenov, a professional soccer player 
for Lokomotiv team and one of the managers of the Kazakhstan Temir Zholy a 
national company. 
 
She is the chairperson of the board of directors of ElitStroy and owns a spa center. 
Despite her many talents, Aliya did not try politics and, so far, has not been 
considered a potential candidate for her father’s post. Her husband Daniyar 
Khasenov is a small player. 
 
																																								 																				
51 http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/#/version:static_country:Kazakhstan  
52 http://www.exclusive.kz/i_data/1173070791.jpg  
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President Nazarbaev’s Other Relatives and Children 
Many of President Nazarbaev’s extended family hold key positions in public offices, 
particularly in law-enforcement, and the private sector. Sarybay Kalmurzaev, 
Kayrat Satybaldy, Nurali Aliev, Samat Abish, Svetlana Nazarbaeva, and Bolat 
Nazarbaev – is a partial list of Nazarbaev family clan which professionally and 
personally benefit and guard the father of the clan – Mr. Nazarbaev. 
 
According to Rakhat Aliev, President Nazarbaev hides two other wives besides 
Sara, his first wife.  Gulnara Rakisheva who was a flight attendant of the president 
in 1996 later became his second wife and gave birth to two daughters.53 After a few 
years the relationship cooled down and since 2004 Gulnara has been living in Spain. 
Nazarbaev’s third wife is Asel Isabaeva, 28, former Miss Kazakhstan 1999. In 2005 
she gave a birth to Nazarbaev’s first son in a clinic in Turkey. Rakhat Aliev claims 
Nazarbaev intends to install his only son as the next president in 2035 when his 
offspring will turn 30. Although Aliev’s claim is aimed at instigating public anger at 
Nazarbaev, this alleged plan to stay in power until 2035 is not realistic - Nazarbaev 
would be 95. 
 
According to unconfirmed reports the personal wealth of president Nazarbaev is 
estimated at no less than US $15 billion. 
 
Other Powerful Politicians 
 




Imangali Tasmagambetov – mayor of Kazakh capital Astana, former mayor of 
Almaty (2004-08), Prime Minister (2002-03), held other important positions. People 
close to Tasmagambetov and locals of Atyrau believe this representative of the 
Young/Small Zhuz is the next president of Kazakhstan. His ambitions to follow 
Nazarbaev are widely known and some local experts believe Tasmagambetov’s 
transfer to Astana is not a promotion but Nazarbaev’s strategy to keep this 
ambitious politician under control.  Mayor Tasmagambetov in the Aliev – Kulibaev 
																																								 																				




clan rivalry was an ally of Kulibaev. As a separate player in the game over the 
throne, Imangali Tasmagambetov is considered by many as the second most 
powerful figure after Kulibaev. The high political rating of the former Almaty 
mayor scares President Nazarbaev who allegedly tasked Aslan Musin, current chief 
of presidential administration, to lessen the attractiveness of the presidential 
candidate among the public by using administrative and media tactics. 
 




His successful career Masimov owns to Timur Kulibaev. Having achieved the post of 
prime-minister Karim Masimov built his own clan of politicians, entrepreneurs and 
bankers to control their share of resources. As an ethnic Uyghur and not very 
sophisticated politician Masimov while claiming no ambitions to run for elections in 





Sarybay Kalmurzaev – manages president’s affairs at the administration of 
President Nazarbaev. Former chairman of the Agency fighting against economic 
crimes and corruption (often called “the financial police”). In the past also held 
important government positions such as deputy head of administration for the 
president, chairman of the State Committee for the management of state property, 
deputy chairman of the State Statistics Committee. Kalmurzaev is considered 











Head of administration of the President, former minister of economy and budget 
planning, governor of Aktube province, and chairman of majlis of Kazakh 
parliament is considered a possible candidate for the next prime-minister. He 
dislikes meeting with press and stays out of the public eye. As a master planner of 
elections, observers see Musin’s promotion as Nazarbaev’s preparations for the 2012 







Served as a mayor of Astana, governor of South Kazakhstan province, deputy head 
of the administration of president, minister of economy. Shukeev who is viewed as 
candidate for the president’s post belongs to Great/ Older Zhuz; according to 
unofficial sources his personal wealth is estimated at nearly US $1 billion. 
 
The future major reshuffling of key government officials including the prime 
minister are expected in Kazakhstan.54 The major aim of these cadre maneuvers, 
according to the president’s plans, is to weaken potential rivals by the election year 
and to balance the power of clans whom Nazarbaev wants to see fighting against 
each other rather then himself. 
 
																																								 																				




KAZAKHSTAN’S CHAIRMANSHIP IN OSCE IN 2010 
 
In 2010, Kazakhstan assumed the chairmanship of the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. Although Kazakh government officials claim the 
country implements pro-democratic reforms, but needs a gradual approach,55 the 
reality on the ground proves just the opposite: restrictive rules for political party 
registration and limits on freedom of expression. Problems with conducting free and 
fair presidential and parliamentary elections clearly indicate Astana’s further move 
towards authoritarianism. 
 
U.S. Representative Alcee Hastings, a Florida Democrat, talking to journalists at a 
press conference in Astana on July 1, 2008 warned that “It is imperative that the 
[Kazakhstani] government undertake concrete reforms on human rights and 
democratization to demonstrate to the international community and to 
Kazakhstan's civil society that they [officials] are ready to assume the [OSCE] 
chairmanship.”56 The then-deputy chief of the U.S. mission to the OSCE, Kyle Scott, 
admitted to RFE/RL's Kazakh Service in late June of 2008 that "Until now I have to 
say we haven't seen as much progress as we would have liked," Scott said, "but the 
year is not over and I am optimistic that in the second half of the year we will see 
further progress by the government of Kazakhstan."57 
 
However, eventual developments in Kazakhstan proved Nazarbaev’s interest at the 
OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly session in Astana in late June 2008. His speech 
about human rights and democracy was given towards the end of Kazakhstan’s 
chairmanship agenda at the OSCE. Kazakhstan’s Senate Speaker Qasymzhomart 
Toqaev was more explicit in describing Kazakhstan’s vision of OSCE who believes I 
twas a “security organization and not a human rights, or an election- monitoring 
organization.”58 Russia and its former Central Asian colonies have been trying to 
dismantle the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the 
democratization arm of the OSCE. Unwilling to accept America’s criticism, Askar 
Tazhiyev, then charge d’affaires at the Kazakhstan Embassy in Washington, 
rebuffed the critical comments made by the U.S. legislators at the congressional 
hearing and went on the offensive saying, "It is very offending to us to hear when 
																																								 																				
55 For instance Kazakh Ambassador Erlan Idrissov’s presentation on security on Central Asia at 
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, MIIS, April 2, 2009. 
56 Eurasia Insight: “KAZAKHSTAN: NAZARBAYEV HINTS THAT DEMOCRATIZATION WILL 
TAKE BACK SEAT ON OSCE AGENDA,” Joanna Lillis: July 9, 2008 Available at: 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav070908_pr.shtml  
57 Eurasia Insight: “U.S. ENVOY TO OSCE SAYS KAZAKHSTAN LAGGING IN REFORMS,” June 
26, 
2008, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp062608.shtml  
58 EurasiaNet: “RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN STRIVE TO PUT OSCE DEMOCRATIZATION ARM 




someone continuously doubts the sincerity of Kazakhstan’s efforts to further our 
own goals and priorities coinciding with the international community’s ones."59 
 
Although it is obvious that Kazakhstan does not fulfill its obligations and pledges,60 
neither EU nor the United States risked preventing Astana from presiding over the 
OSCE due, in part, to the importance of Kazakh state in Eurasian security and 
fossil energy supply. 
 
Europe’s efforts to provide energy resources from gas and oil rich Central Asia, 
bypassing Russia and NATO’s dependence on Central Asian governments to deliver 
non-military cargo to Afghanistan, shifted the West’s policy in the region towards 
Realpolitik relationship vis-à-vis rulers of former Soviet states of Central Asia. 
 
Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the organization was viewed in Central Asia as the 




U.S.— KAZAKHSTANI RELATIONS  
 
The Russian-Georgian conflict over Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia intensified U.S. 
– Russia’s rivalry over the influence in energy rich Central Asia. But over the last 
decade visits of world-class political figures to Astana indicated Kazakhstan as an 
important country for the geo-strategic interest of the major global and regional 
powers. 
 
While Washington attempts to neutralize Moscow’s efforts in bringing Astana under 
the Kremlin’s orbit, President Nazarbaev long seemed willing to satisfy Russia’s 
demands for more loyalty from her neighbors. At the briefing with journalists 
following then-Secretary Rice’s meetings with Kazakhstani leaders in Astana in 
October of 2008, Kazakh Foreign Minister described the relationship with the 
United States as stable and of strategic character but the relations with Russia Mr. 
Tazhin characterized as, “just like excellent and very politically correct.” “Russia is 
our strategic partner,” he added. 
 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan refused to sign the Nabucco 
Declaration at the "Southern Corridor-New Silk Road" summit in Prague in early 
																																								 																				
59 EURASIA INSIGHT: “KAZAKHSTAN: ASTANA DIPLOMAT, ON THE HOT SEAT, GIVES US 
CONGRESSMEN AN EARFUL,” Joshua Kucera, July 25, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav072508.shtml  
60 For instance Foreign Minister Tazhin promised in November of 2007 at the OSCE Ministerial 
Council in Madrid that the government would liberalize the registration requirements for political 
parties, reform the 
law on elections, the media law, and incorporate recommendations by the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in election legislation. 
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May of 2009. Russia’s negative stance towards the strategic energy project and 
particularly after the Russian-Georgian conflict, the Central Asian leaders need to 
seriously consider Russia’s position. The “Russian-Georgian conflict syndrome,” 
eliminated the illusion that the West, and particularly the United States, will 
militarily intervene to defend their pro-Western allies. This need has shifted the 
world assessment of Central Asian leaders worried about the stability of their 
personal regimes. The outcomes of the war - a significant psychological victory for 
Russia that even Azerbaijan (having anti-Russian posture amid the Armenian-Azeri 
conflict) now seeks warm relations with the “Russian Bear.” 
 
Russia’s willingness to employ military means in protecting its “privileged 
interests” in her “southern backyard” has just, once again, been emphasized in the 
new “national security strategy up to 2020.” The document was signed by then-
President (Now Russian Prime Minister)Medvedev on May 12. The Russian 
Government predicts that, “In conditions of rivalry for resources the resolving of 
problems by use of military power is not excluded – the established balance of power 
near the borders of the Russian Federation and borders of her allies can be broken.” 
Medvedev considered the development of close ties with the Commonwealth of 
Independent States as a priority in Russian foreign policy. Key concerns of national 
security for Kazakhstan are its dissatisfaction with the course of relations, security 
of its northern borders (6,846 km border with Russia) and the mood of the large 
Russian Diaspora in Kazakhstan. 
 
There are other important factors influencing the U.S. - Kazakhstan relations. 
Kazakhstan, although reluctant to accept independence of Abkhazia and Southern 
Ossetia, fully supported the intervention of Russian troops into Georgia in August. 
During his press conference with President of Latvia Valdis Zatlers in Astana on 
October 10, 2008 President Nazarbaev stated he “understands the actions of Russia 
after Georgia attacked Southern Ossetia.” “I am personally a witness that Georgia 
started first,” added Kazakh president.61 Director of Kazakhstan Institute of 
Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan Bulat Sultanov said,“Georgia’s 
aggression against Southern Ossetia is a genocide of Georgia against the people of 
Southern Ossetia” while addressing the third high level Russian-Kazakhstan 
conference on bilateral relations held in Almaty in late September.62 
 
On September 22, 2008 Kazakhstan’s Agriculture Minister Akylbek Kurishbaev 
announced that his country had canceled plans to build a grain terminal in 
																																								 																				
61 “Nursultan Nazarbaev svidetelstvuet chto Gruziya napala pervoi” 
(“Nursultan Nazarbaev witnesses that Georgia attacked first,” in Russian), October 3, 2008. 
Available at: http://news.ng.ru/2008/10/03/1223025443.html  
62 “Eksperty Kazakhstana i Rossii vnov obratilis k analizu dvustoronnix otnosheniy” (“Experts from 






Georgian port Poti. “This issue now is linked with international problems, with the 
situation in Georgia,” Mr. Kurishbaev explained.63 According to Reuters, the 
Kazakhs had previously told the Georgians, “Astana had no intention of putting the 
investment project in danger but that Kazakh companies decided to abandon 
investment plans in Georgia, while others continue to invest in our country," 
acknowledged First Deputy Economy Minister of Georgia.64 Kazakhstan exports 6 
million tons of wheat via the Russian and Ukrainian Black Sea ports. Earlier, 
Kazakhstan’s National Company “KazMunayGaz” stated it had abandoned the idea 
of building an oil refinery in Batumi sea port in Georgia. Before cancellation of 
these two investment projects, Kazakhstan was considered Georgia’s second largest 
investor after the United States. 
 
To reward Kazakhstan’s support for Russia on the crisis in the Caucasus, the 
Kremlin signed eight documents, at the fifth jubilee border region forum of the 
Russian Federation in Kazakh city of Aktobe on September 22, 2008, chaired by the 
Kazakh and Russian presidents. The forum served as a catalyst for closer ties which 
promises significant economic and political gains for Kazakhstan. Economic benefits 
of closer ties with Russia is a significant determinant in the decision making 
process. 
 
Kazakh leadership official statements, although carefully worded, was critical with 
regards to its relations with Moscow and Washington. There is discontent in Astana 
regarding America’s criticism of Nazarbaev’s commitment to implement political 
and economic reforms. The ongoing bribery scandal of “Kazakhgate” inflicted 
enormous damage to reputation of President Nazarbaev and his government and it 
is another major issue that impedes smoother relations between the United States 
and Kazakhstan. 
 
Dariga Nazarbaeva, the elder daughter of Kazakh president hired ‘GlobalOptions 
Management,’ an affiliate of Washington consulting firm ‘Global Options Group 
Inc.’ to gather information on the process of a bribery investigation that may have 
negative political implications for the Nazarbaev’s family and his close associates. 
 
The authors of the Wall Street Journal, revealed the story about Dariga 
Nazarbaeva’s intelligence operation. With the help of a well-connected private 
security consultant in Washington, WSJ asserted that the investigation is in the 
minds of Kazakh authorities. The effort underscores how concerned Kazakh leaders 
were with the bribery investigation, which had been an impediment to broader ties 
with the U.S.65 
																																								 																				
63 “Gruziya stalkivaetsa s izolatsiey” (“Georgia faces isolation,” in Russian), ‘Vzglad’ Russian 
newspaper, September 22, 2008. Available at: http://www.vz.ru/economy/2008/9/22/210668.html  
64 “Kazakhs Drop Georgian Port Plan, Citing Instability,” September 22, 2008  Available at: 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Kazakhs_Drop_Georgian_Port_Plan_Citing_Instability/1201911.html  




The U.S. Government has been vocal [with support of many local opposition groups, 
international and local independent media, NGOs and think tanks] in criticizing the 
Kazakh government’s performance in political and economic reform. Europeans 
have been promoting warm relations with Kazakhstan and other Central Asian 
countries to secure their economic interests. Hearings in the United States 
Congress have signaled concern over the lack of progress on promises made by 
Astana’s to conduct democratic reforms. 
 
The Government of Kazakhstan has been concerned with its image on the 
international arena and it undertook PR campaigns abroad. One such effort was 
recently discovered in the U.S. press. To improve the image of the government, 
Kazakhstan’s emissaries paid both the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns 
Hopkins University and the Washington lobbying firm ‘APCO Worldwide’ to 
produce positive reports on Kazakhstan. The ABC report claims “The payments, 
brokered through the government's Washington lobbying firm, APCO Worldwide, 
were part of Kazakhstan's broader effort to bring attention and burnish its imagine 
inside the Beltway.”66 Ken Silverstein, another investigator of Kazakhstan’s image 
making efforts in Washington, states, “Kazakh government paid CACI about 
$26,000 per study”.67 
 
The promotion of Nazarbaev’s personal prestige, and his chairmanship of the OSCE 
(Organization for Security and Cooperation) in Europe in 2010, did not go smoothly. 
The American government was cautious in approving Kazakhstan’s candidacy, 
given that country’s poor human rights and democratization record. The United 
States has been promoting economic reforms, democracy and human rights since 
the birth of independent Republic of Kazakhstan. Now however, the Kazakh 
leadership is less tolerant of internal and outside criticism - Nazarbaev feels more 
confident in himself, thanks to his country’s vast natural resources and geostrategic 
location that brought economic growth and leverage to Kazakhstan. His importance 
gives him an opportunity to exploit the situation visa-via Russia and the United 
Sates.  
 
President Nazarbaev understands that the President of Uzbekistan was forgiven by 
the West for his massacre of innocent people in Andijan in 2005 and the absence of 
political and economic reforms in his country. Therefore, Nazarbaev feels he should 
not be humiliated by the on-going corruption investigation by the US Department of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Information on Probe,” GLENN R. SIMPSON, SUSAN SCHMIDT and MARY JACOBY, May 12, 
2008. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB121056056698384341- 
lMyQjAxMDI4MTEwMjUxNjIwWj.html  
66 “Kazakhstan Pays for Academic Reports: Johns Hopkins Institute Says It Had Complete 
Independence,” Emma Schwartz, September 29, 2008. Available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=5908348  
67 “Lobbyists and Fred Starr Team Up to Promote Kazakhstan,” Ken Silverstein, 
Harper’s Magazine, October 1, 2008. Available at http://harpers.org/archive/2008/10/hbc-90003642  
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Justice on the Kazakh president himself and his high-ranking officials in cabinet. 
 
Central Asian leaders have been anxious about their image abroad and particularly 
in the West, which explains the cosmetic reforms aimed at outsider perceptions. A 
positive image abroad gives them more legitimacy at home. Nazarbaev has been 
able to secure his position through successful economic policies and some shadowy 
political measures. In combination with his growing wealth and the rich energy 
resources of the country, Nazarbaev has elevated his self-assessment which makes 
outside players harder to deal with him on others’ terms. 
 
Despite Kazakhstan’s high value, the U.S. should not surrender to Nazarbaev’s 
refusal to deliver genuine reforms. The US and its European partners should foster 
the firm stand that the West will not tolerate any further steps towards 
authoritarianism. After the Russia-Ukraine conflict over energy prices in late 2005 
– 2006 raised concerns about energy security in Europe, the EU became more 
tolerant of Central Asian authoritarian regimes. Search of alternative gas and oil 
supply to Europe explains Germany’s bridging role in improving ties between the 
West and Central Asian leaders despite their repressive and corrupt practices. 
 
The geostrategic importance of the region and the anti-terrorism campaign in 
Afghanistan is another influence shaping the West’s positive view towards the 
“Stans.” OSCE members’ approval of Kazakhstan’s candidacy for chairmanship in 








LINKS TO NEWS AND RESOURCES ON KAZAKHSTAN/CENTRAL ASIA 
 
News on Kazakhstan/Central Asia in English and Russian 









News on Kazakhstan/Central Asia in Russian: 
Russian news web site Centrasia.ru: 
http://www.centrasia.ru/  
 
News on Kazakhstan/Central Asia in English: 






Institute for War & Peace Reporting: 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=346738&apc_state=henprca  
 


















News on Kazakhstan in Kazakh: 




International Crisis Group: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1251&l=1  
 
Russian and Eurasian Security Network: 
http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/sw/index.cfm  
 
National Bureau of Asian Research: 
http://www.nbr.org/  
 
RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy: 
http://www.rand.org/international_programs/capp/pubs/central.html  
 
Regional International Organizations 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization: 
http://www.sectsco.org/  
  
Eurasian Economic Community: 
http://www.evrazes.com/  
 
Collective Security Treaty Organization: 
http://www.dkb.gov.ru/  
 
Government Agencies and Ministries 
Official Web site of the Office of the President of Kazakhstan 
www.akorda.kz  
 
Official Web site of the Government 
www.government.kz  
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
www.mfa.kz  
 
Ministry of Agriculture 
www.minagri.kz  
  






Ministry of Education and Science 
www.edu.gov.kz  
 
Ministry of Environment Protection 
www.nature.kz  
 
National Environmental Action Plan for Sustainable Development 
www.neapsd.kz  
 
Ministry of Finance 
www.minfin.kz  
 
Ministry of Health 
www.dari.kz  
 
Ministry of Internal Affairs 
www.mvd.kz  
 
Ministry of Industry and Trade 
www.mit.kz  
 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
www.enbek.kz  
 
National Security Committee 
www.knb.kz  
 
Agency on Information and Communications 
http://www.aic.gov.kz  
 
Kazinvest - the official investment promotion agency 
www.kazinvest.kz  
 
Kazpost National Postal Service 
www.kazpost.kz  
 
Parliament of Kazakhstan 
www.parlam.kz/  
 
Central Election Commission 
www.election.kz and www.kazelection2004.org  
  





Foreign Investors Council under the President of Kazakhstan 
www.fic.kz  
 
Investment Fund of Kazakhstan 
www.ifk.kz  
 
Kazakhstan Development Bank 
www.kdb.kz  
 
Kazakhstan Contract Agency 
www.kca.kz  
 










US-Kazakhstan Chamber of Commerce 
www.uskazakhstanchamberofcommerce.8k.com  
 
Almaty Business Communications Centre 
www.almatybcc.kz  
 
News Agencies and Newspapers 
Khabar News Agency 
www.khabar.kz  
 






Kazakh Information news agency 
www.inform.kz  
 





“Argumenty i Fakty Kazakhstan weekly” newspaper 
www.aif.kz  
 






“Novoe Pokolenie” weekly newspaper 
www.np.kz  
 
Panorama weekly newspaper 
www.panorama.kz  
 
“Vremya weekly” newspaper 
www.time.kz  
 
“Continent” analytical magazine 
www.continent.kz  
 
“Nomad” web site 
www.nomad.su  
 
Information about Kazakhstan 
www.site.kz  
 
Link to sites about Kazakhstan 
http://welcome.to/kazakhstan  
 
Kazakhstan Development Gateway 
www.kazakhstan-gateway.kz  
